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Bursting the Auto Loan Bubble in the
Wake of COVID-19
Pamela Foohey*
ABSTRACT: Before the COVID-19 pandemic, auto loans outstanding in the
United States had soared to record highs. The boom in lending spanned new
and used cars and traditional and subprime loans. With loan delinquencies
also hitting new highs almost every quarter, predictions that the auto lending
market could burst soon abounded. When the economy came to a grinding
halt and unemployment skyrocketed in the wake of the pandemic, auto lenders
knew they were facing a crisis. Throughout 2020, auto lenders granted more
payment forbearances to consumers, while slashing interest rates on new
loans. Auto manufacturers similarly made promises to buyers, such as the
ability to return new cars for up to a year upon job loss. Combined with the
CARES Act’s relief rebates and moratoria, the bottom did not fall out of the
auto loan market.
These measures, however, are temporary. The pandemic alone will not reduce
people’s need for cars, but it will burst the auto loan bubble. The economic
fallout will require interventions in the auto sale and loan markets, which
presents a moment to transform America’s car economy. This symposium
Essay details a range of financial and related measures that can be
implemented in the near future to shift auto financing away from promoting
economically unequal and environmentally unfriendly use and access to
automobiles, and, more broadly, to shift the United States away from
prioritizing automobiles as the primary means of personal transportation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In most places in the United States, having an automobile is critical for
everyday life, such as for getting to work and school, accessing healthcare and
daycare, and shopping for essentials.1 This makes the perception that people
can choose to live “car free” largely inaccurate. For instance, households
without cars have lower incomes, while having a car increases people’s
probability of employment.2 People’s reliance on cars traces to accumulated
policy decisions by the federal, state, and local governments that have
prioritized automobiles as the mode of transportation in the United States.3
This reality has led roughly 85 percent of households in the United States to
own at least one car.4
Because few households have enough money saved to purchase even very
used cars, let alone gently used and new cars, more than two-thirds of people
fund their car ownership with hefty auto loans.5 Auto lenders have seized on
this need for financing.6 During the past decade, auto debt has skyrocketed,
increasing nearly 40 percent overall, with the average auto loan for a new car

1. See Pamela Foohey, Consumers’ Declining Power in the Fintech Auto Loan Market, 15 BROOK.
J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=366
4136 [https://perma.cc/UQ5G-CLAX] (detailing the necessity of automobiles).
2. Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 287, 289–90 (2020) [hereinafter Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy].
3. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–2) (discussing how the United States’
infrastructure supports car ownership); Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 498, 502–04 (2020) (explaining law has played a role in “cementing” America’s carcentrism).
4. See Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 308 tbl.1 (reporting car ownership
data from the Federal Reserve’s 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances).
5. See CHERYL R. COOPER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11192, THE AUTOMOBILE LENDING
MARKET AND POLICY ISSUES (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11192.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2MFV-BYZQ] (noting that, “at the end of 2018, . . . roughly 45% of adult Americans
. . . had an auto loan”); BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015 42 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/2015-report-economicwell-being-us-households-201605.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD44-7BLD] (reporting that in 2015,
two-thirds of people who purchased automobiles, new or used, financed their purchase with a
loan); Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Folly of Credit as Pandemic Relief,
68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 126, 136 (2020) [hereinafter Foohey et al., The Folly] (noting “[a]
study conducted in March 2020 found that more than half of all individuals do not have savings
to cover three months of expenses”).
6. See generally Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending
Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. 1257 (2020) (detailing how the auto loan market is set up to disadvantage
consumers and concluding that the market is “rife with consumer abuses”); Foohey, supra note 1
(detailing power dynamics in modern auto loan deals).
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rising 11 percent.7 Part of the growth stemmed from a flourishing subprime
auto loan market, which now accounts for nearly one-quarter of the $1.33
trillion in auto loan debt outstanding.8 Overall, as of the beginning of 2020,
auto loans made up about nine percent of household debt,9 making “[t]he
auto loan market . . . the third-largest consumer credit market in the United
States,” behind home loans and student loans.10
More auto debt, combined with more expensive loans, has led to
increased delinquencies and defaults in the past decade.11 Auto loan
deficiencies hit an all-time high at the end of 2019, with seven million
Americans 90 or more days behind on their auto loan payments.12 Before the
COVID-19 pandemic, people with subprime auto loans were defaulting within
the first few months of borrowing at rates rivaling those during the 2008
financial crisis.13
Prior to the pandemic, the build-up of auto loan debt outstanding and
the growth in delinquencies and defaults led experts to classify the auto loan
market as a bubble and to predict that the bubble would burst soon.14 The
7. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Ken Brown & Shane Shifflett, Families Go Deep in Debt to Stay in
the Middle Class, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/families-godeep-in-debt-to-stay-in-the-middle-class-11564673734 [https://perma.cc/52N7-UUMW] (stating
that both figures are inflation adjusted).
8. See Elisabeth Buchwald, Outstanding Auto-Loan Balances Just Hit a New Record and
Delinquencies Are on the Rise—Should You Be Concerned?, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 25, 2020, 2:18 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/outstanding-auto-loan-balances-just-hit-a-new-record-anddelinquencies-are-on-the-rise-should-you-be-concerned-2020-02-21[https://perma.cc/ELQ2-XMME]
(discussing the auto loan market as of the end of 2019); Joy Wiltermuth, Cracks in the $1.3 Trillion
Auto-Finance Market Aren’t Curbing Investor Demand for Risky Debt, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 20, 2020,
11:05 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/cracks-in-the-13-trillion-auto-finance-market-arentcurbing-investor-demand-for-risky-debt-2020-02-19 [https://perma.cc/XAU2-T5JM] (same).
9. See CTR. FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 3 (2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2020Q1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9M2-ZDVV].
10. See COOPER, supra note 5, at 1.
11. See CTR. FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, supra note 9, at 26 (detailing “Transition into
Serious Delinquency (90+) for Auto Loans by Age”).
12. See Jeff Cox, A Record Number of Americans Are 90 Days Behind on Their Car Payments, CNBC
(Feb. 13, 2019 6:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/12/a-record-number-of-americansare-90-days-behind-on-their-car-payments.html [https://perma.cc/CW3W-AG4P] (reporting on
data from the New York Fed); Jessica Menton, An Economic Slowdown Could Spell Trouble for the
Rising Number of People Behind on Car Payments, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2020/03/02/coronavirus-delinquent-borrowerscould-feel-more-pain-if-economy-slows/4897107002 [https://perma.cc/XAW5-SB2Y].
13. See Wolf Richter, Auto Loan Delinquency Rates Are Worse Now than During the Financial Crisis,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2018, 4:16 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/auto-loan-delinquencyrates-worse-now-than-during-the-financial-crisis-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/M9SL-RYPC] (noting
that the 60+ day delinquency rate had risen to 5.8 percent and was “higher even than during the
Financial Crisis”).
14. See, e.g., James Alford, Are Subprime Auto Loans Driving the Next Financial Crisis?, REGUL.
REV. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/23/alford-subprime-auto-loansdriving-next-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/X5QW-KKET]; Steven Pearlstein, The Shadow Banks
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United States’ strong pre-pandemic economy combined with a low
unemployment rate likely were the leading reasons that the bubble did not
burst at that time.15 Yet, even then, multiple reports recognized that the rise
in auto debt in the United States showed an unsustainable dependence on
automobiles financed by households.16 Commentators also pointed out that
the market for securities backed by auto loans, particularly sub-prime auto
loans, was “going gangbusters” and bore a striking resemblance to the home
mortgage market before the Great Recession, albeit of a smaller scale.17
The economic conditions that continued to fuel the auto loan bubble
while preventing its burst ended abruptly in March 2020 when the states
across the country enacted various stay-at-home orders to try to control
COVID-19’s spread. Unemployment rates skyrocketed past their Great
Recession highs as businesses closed their doors.18 Uber and Lyft drivers, some
Are Back with Another Big Bad Credit Bubble, WASH. POST (May 31, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-shadow-banks-are-back-with-another-big-badcredit-bubble/2019/05/31/a05184de-817a-11e9-95a9-e2c830afe24f_story.html [https://perma.cc
/4CS6-YCRV] (linking auto loans with the growing “shadow” banking system); Is a Subprime Auto
Loan Crisis Brewing?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb. 18, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton
.upenn.edu/article/auto-loan-subprime-crisis [https://perma.cc/NBA5-V2EL] (discussing whether
subprime auto loans present a crisis similar to homes loans during the Great Recession); see also
R.J. CROSS, TONY DUTZIK, ED MIERZWINSKI & MATT CASALE, DRIVING INTO DEBT: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF RISKY AUTO LOANS TO CONSUMERS AND OUR COMMUNITIES 27–28 (2019), https://
uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/WEB_USP_Driving-into-debt_Report_021219.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X6ZY-HQL4] (detailing disparities in auto loan rates between communities of color
and white borrowers and discussing how to protect consumers).
15. See Joseph Wildey, Has the COVID-19 Crisis Popped the American Auto Loan Bubble?, MEDIUM
(Mar. 15, 2020), https://medium.com/@joseph.wildey/has-the-covid-19-crisis-popped-the-americanauto-loan-bubble-48818e55fec4 [https://perma.cc/G8MM-NGCS] (noting that the economy
was staving off concerns about the auto loan market prior to the pandemic); Barb Rosewicz, Mike
Maciag & Joe Fleming, Every State Posted Economic Gains in Year Before the Pandemic, PEW (Apr. 28,
2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2020/04/28/every-stateposted-economic-gains-in-year-before-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/76KL-VZZT] (noting
that the end of 2019 boasted a record long economic expansion).
16. See Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 330–31 (predicting that if auto
debt continues on its present course, more people will file bankruptcy to deal with auto loans);
Laura Bliss, If the Economy Is So Great, Why Are Car Loan Defaults at a Record High?, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Feb. 15, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-15/
why-so-many-americans-are-behind-on-car-loan-payments [https://perma.cc/A5TR-DZ67] (noting
the “catch-22” of cars); CROSS ET AL., supra note 14, at 7–8 (proposing ideas to expand
transportation options).
17. Robert Armstrong, Yield-Crazed Investors Pile into US Subprime Car Loans, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2019, 5:05 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/59f3a084-0d80-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84
[https://perma.cc/87EY-5HLH] (quoting analyst Jennifer Thomas of Loomis Sayles); see also
Wiltermuth, supra note 8; Chris Taylor, Why Some Experts Think Auto Loans Are the Next ‘Red Flag’
for the Economy, FORTUNE (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/01/16/car-loansdefault-us-economy-subprime-dangers [https://perma.cc/9AEV-MMQT] (noting that the auto
loan market is about one-tenth of the size of the home mortgage market at its height).
18. See Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of COVID-19 than It Did in
Two Years of the Great Recession, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-
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of whom had taken out loans to purchase vehicles, saw their ridership and
income plummet.19 Within weeks of the World Health Organization declaring
a pandemic,20 Congress stepped in to stabilize businesses’ and households’
financial situations with the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act.21
As detailed in Part II of this Essay, the CARES Act provided households
with money and enforced pauses of other debt payments such that people
were seemingly able to stay current on car loan payments through the fall of
2020.22 A handful of states also legislated additional debt relief for
households.23 Auto dealers and lenders likewise struggled during the
pandemic, and they focused on enticing people to become or remain
customers, rather than repossessing cars.24 Through these combined
measures, auto loan defaults did not increase immediately.

years-of-the-great-recession [https://perma.cc/VB2U-SV4U] (reporting that the unemployment
rate rose from 3.8 percent in February 2020 to 13 percent in May 2020, and that unemployment
during the Great Recession peaked at 10.6 percent); Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High 14.7
Percent in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (May 13, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2020/unemployment-rate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm [https://perma.
cc/YW3C-FR23].
19. See Nicu Calcea, Uber and Lyft Are Cutting Even Further into the Taxi Market During the
Pandemic, CITY MONITOR (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.citymetric.com/transport/uber-lyft-ridesduring-coronavirus-pandemic-taxi-data-5232 [https://perma.cc/9JAC-UJJW] (detailing the decline
in ridesharing usage in New York City); Sissi Cao, The Great Rideshare Crash: Uber, Lyft, and More
Plan Layoffs as Drivers Flounder, OBSERVER (Apr. 30, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://observer.com/2020
/04/uber-lyft-coronavirus-layoff-ride-sharing-plummet [https://perma.cc/CD3U-S9AG] (explaining
that plummeting ridesharing demand led to planned layoffs at some of the industry’s largest
companies); Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5–6) (detailing Uber’s (unsuccessful) program
to provide auto loans to drivers).
20. The World Health Organization declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Archived:
WHO Timeline - COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.who.int/newsroom/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline—-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/G3UW-PKKQ].
21. Congress passed and the President signed the CARES Act into law on March 27, 2020.
See CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001–80);
The Treasury Department is Delivering COVID-19 Relief for All Americans, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares [https://perma.cc/6766-KCZ4].
22. See Foohey et al., The Folly, supra note 5, at 129–40 (reviewing the primary relief offered
by the CARES Act).
23. See Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection Pandemic,
11 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 222, 229–35 (2020) [hereinafter Foohey et al., Debt Collection Pandemic]
(reviewing states’ efforts to combat debt collection after the CARES Act’s passage); infra note 40
and accompanying text.
24. See Michael Wayland, The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Upended Auto Sales and Buying a Car
Will Never Be the Same, CNBC (May 21, 2020, 1:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/thecoronavirus-pandemic-has-upended-auto-sales-and-buying-a-car-will-never-be-the-same.html [https://
perma.cc/GHN5-4MXG] (discussing some ways that auto sellers initially tried to adapt).
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Nonetheless, the crisis exposed the cracks in the United States’
economy.25 The trifecta of a small cash infusion, moratoria on some debt
collection, and auto lenders’ incentives likely will merely hold off a crash in
auto sales and lending. For auto loans, this warns of the bubble’s eventual
burst.
Part III assumes that in the coming years, the auto market will have to
adjust more drastically to the pandemic’s economic fallout. How people
access and pay for cars will need to change in light of continued financial
instability among households. Proceeding from this assumption, this Part
presents a range of financial and related measures that federal and state
governments could implement to reset the car industry, both in terms of how
people shop for cars and car loans, and the specifications of vehicles on
American roads.
More broadly, the convergence of the pandemic’s unique economic
shock with an already unstable auto loan market presents an opportunity for
a deeper and more holistic consideration of the United States’ transportation
priorities. Part IV places auto loans within a broader federal, state, and local
government urban planning agenda that could transform people’s need for
cars. As the United States necessarily crafts a large-scale agenda to revive the
economy, now might offer an opportune moment to advocate for
interventions that include measures to shift the country’s transportation
structure away from cars and towards a range of more sustainable and safer
options.
II. STAVING OFF THE BUBBLE’S BURST
COVID-19’s emergence ended the post-Great Recession economic
expansion.26 Employment losses between March 2020 and the end of August
2020 wiped out almost all of the job growth during the prior decade and GDP
plummeted over 30 percent in those five months.27 Retail spending also
quickly dropped, particularly at brick-and-mortar stores and for discretionary
items.28 Although spending rebounded later in the summer of 2020, the pace

25. See David J. Lynch, The Coronavirus Crisis Is Exposing how the Economy Was Not Strong as It
Seemed, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2020, 3:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/
28/recession-economy-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/32UU-3S5Q].
26. See Chart Book: Tracking the Post-Great Recession Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-tracking-thepost-great-recession-economy [https://perma.cc/Q7BF-MPZP] (reporting data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
27. See id. (reporting data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis).
28. See Michael Corkery & Sapna Maheshwari, Retail Sales Rise for Third Month, Though Growth
Slows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/business/retail-salescoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/G3J9-QG76] (reporting data from the Commerce Department).
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of its recovery was slowed by the coronavirus’s continued spread.29
Employment figures bounced back a bit as well, but the chair of the Federal
Reserve viewed this growth with caution and commented that “so many
people [are] in need.”30 Overall, as 2020 drew to a close, it was apparent that
the United States’ economic recovery would not be swift, particularly without
additional government support.31
Given the state of the economy, it seems reasonable to have predicted
that auto sales and lending also would have dropped quickly after March 2020
and that loan delinquencies would have risen, potentially significantly in the
face of wide-spread unemployment.32 Stated differently, the auto loan bubble
should have at least shown signs of impending rupture. Yet the second and
third quarters of 2020 saw decreases in auto loan delinquencies.33 These
declines coincided with decreases in delinquencies across non-mortgage
consumer credit products, such as credit cards.34 In contrast, mortgage

29. See Harriet Torry, U.S. Retail Spending Grew at Slower Pace in August, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16,
2020, 1:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-economy-august-retail-sales-coronavirus-recovery11600200513 [https://perma.cc/7LKB-2Z6Y] (reporting data from the Commerce Department).
30. Jim Tankersley, Powell Says Rates Are Likely to Stay Low for Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020,
8:39 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/09/04/business/stock-market-today-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/DN54-3GAQ] (quoting Jerome H. Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve).
31. See Jim Tankersley & Emily Cochrane, Biden Team, Pushing Quick Stimulus Deal, Prepares
for Renewed Recession, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/business/
economy/biden-coronavirus-stimulus-recession.html [https://perma.cc/BC72-PU8A]; Tracking
America’s Recovery, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/business/us-economic-recovery-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/GE4X-B978]; Anneken Tappe, The Unemployment Rate Has Never Been This
High Going into an Election, CNN BUS. (Oct. 1, 2020, 7:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
10/01/economy/september-jobs-report-preview/index.html [https://perma.cc/8L45-BER7].
32. This prediction appeared frequently in popular media. See, e.g., Wolf Richter, Subprime
Auto-Loan Delinquencies, Loan Deferrals & Stimulus Curdle into Curious Phenomenon, WOLF ST. (Sept.
13, 2020), https://wolfstreet.com/2020/09/13/subprime-auto-loan-delinquencies-loan-deferralsstimulus-curdle-into-curious-phenomenon [https://perma.cc/4WBX-DNDQ] (commenting that
during the pandemic, “the [subprime auto loan] delinquency rates should have spiked
. . . into the sky”); Jean Eaglesham & Ken Brown, Auto-Lending Binge Threatens to Unwind When
Stimulus Measures Ease, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/autolending-binge-threatens-to-unwind-when-stimulus-measures-ease-11596798003 [https://perma.cc/
E3CB-9685] (noting “signs of trouble even before the crisis hit” in the auto loan market); Melissa
Angell, Credit Unions Are ‘Going to See Auto Lending Die’ Because of Coronavirus, AM. BANKER (Apr. 6,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/creditunions/news/credit-unions-are-going
-to-see-auto-lending-die-because-of-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/S9BN-QZDH] (quoting Bill
Handel, a VP of Research at Raddon, as saying “people just aren’t making those purchases”).
33. See Press Release, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Total Household Debt Increased in Q3 2020,
Led by Surge in New Credit Extensions; Mortgage Originations, Including Refinances, Continue
to Soar (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2020/20
201117 [https://perma.cc/JD9Z-UH2J]; Stefan Lembo Stolba, Consumer Delinquencies Slow During
Pandemic, EXPERIAN (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.experian.com/blogs/askexperian/research/
consumer-delinquencies-slow-during-pandemic [https://perma.cc/PDX7-GGPB] (reporting based
on Experian data).
34. See Press Release, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., supra note 33 (noting declining credit card
delinquencies); Stolba, supra note 33 (noting the same based on based on Experian data); Charge-

E5_FOOHEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2222

7/18/2021 7:35 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:2215

delinquencies increased, although the CARES Act’s foreclosure moratorium
provided homeowners the ability to defer payments.35
Consumer credit products, including auto loans, benefitted from the
CARES Act’s provisions designed to help households weather the economic
fallout of stay-at-home orders.36 The CARES Act’s extra unemployment
compensation and relief rebate payments, delivered primarily in April
through the end of July, aided households in paying recurring expenses and
allowed them to stay current on some debts.37 Indeed, the CARES Act’s
payments “ke[pt] more than [ten] million people out of poverty” according
to a report from the Urban Institute. 38
The CARES Act also allowed people to prioritize auto debt over other
debt by pausing payments on home loans, some rent payments, and student
loans.39 A handful of states legislated or decreed additional protections, such
as eviction and debt collection moratoria.40 Although very few states added
protections such as halts on auto repossessions,41 pausing the collection of

Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS.
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallsa.htm [https://
perma.cc/9SZE-Y6NM] (reporting delinquencies at commercial banks).
35. See Foohey et al., The Folly, supra note 5, at 129–35 (discussing the CARES Act’s
moratoria); FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., supra note 33 (noting the CARES Act); Carmen Reinicke,
Mortgage Delinquencies Surge More Than 8% to a 9-Year High as the Coronavirus Pandemic Hits a Corner
of the Housing Market, MKTS. INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2020, 6:27 PM), https://markets.business
insider.com/news/stocks/mortgage-delinquencies-spike-year-high-coronavirus-pandemic-housingfha-payments-2020-8-1029509846 [https://perma.cc/WU5T-CFRY]; Kim Eng Ky & Ben
Horowitz, Ninth District Mortgage Delinquency Rates Surge; Other Rates Stable, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (July 9, 2020), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2020/ninth-districtmortgage-delinquency-rates-surge-other-rates-stable [https://perma.cc/X76Z-L6RS] (comparing
mortgage and other consumer credit products delinquency rates).
36. See Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu, & Vanessa Swales, See Which States and Cities Have Told
Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html [https://perma.cc/Y9K6-CHUX] (detailing stayat-home orders).
37. See Foohey et al., The Folly, supra note 5, at 135–40 (detailing CARES Act provisions
designed to help households). “The Lost Wages Assistance program, created by a [Presidential]
memorandum . . . in early August, provided some unemployed [individuals] with an additional
$300” a week through the beginning of September 2020, although the program was “rolled out
haphazardly.” Jennifer Liu, Scores of Workers Still Haven’t Seen $300 Unemployment Boost—In Some
States, It’s Already Gone, CNBC MAKE IT (Sept. 24, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020
/09/24/scores-of-workers-still-havent-seen-300-unemployment-boost.html [https://perma.cc/
449D-8CC9].
38. LINDA GIANNARELLI, LAURA WHEATON & GREGORY ACS, URB. INST., 2020 POVERTY
PROJECTIONS, 9 (2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102521/2020poverty-projections_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB38-LFB3].
39. See Foohey et al., The Folly, supra note 5, at 129–35 (detailing CARES Act provisions that
provided for moratoria on payment of debt).
40. Id. (detailing states’ measures to stop debt collection).
41. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., STATE PROTECTIONS AGAINST VEHICLE REPOSSESSION
DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS (2020), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JOy2enWm
8C_qBk27oyMCxbhKbYrczaHj75IQV2OhJTc/edit [https://perma.cc/48AT-SDDA] (detailing
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other delinquent debts likely further allowed people to focus on remaining
current with their auto loans. As noted, besides homes (and housing costs
generally) and student loans, cars constitute households’ biggest expense.42
Given that research shows that people continue to pay auto loans even as they
fall behind on other debts,43 with the other two big expenses temporarily
taken care of, households likely allocated cash to keeping their cars. The
pandemic also led people to avoid mass transit, which led to increased interest
in purchasing older used cars, which presented a marginally more budget
friendly option than purchasing new or slightly used vehicles.44
Possibly just as much as the CARES Act’s and state’s interventions to help
people, auto dealerships and lenders played a key role in propping up the
auto loan market. As the economy collapsed, banks, other lenders, and
businesses, including auto dealers, also struggled.45 To entice new customers
and retain current customers, dealers heavily promoted sales, moved sales
online, and otherwise went out of their way to accommodate people who
could not or did not feel comfortable coming to physical locations.46 Car
dealerships also partnered with lenders to offer programs that provided
people with assurances should their financial situations change. For instance,
Ford launched the “Ford Promise,” which allowed customers to “buy or lease
an eligible Ford vehicle through Ford Credit. Then, if you face financial
hardship due to loss of employment, you can return it within one year of
purchase.”47 Similarly, other lenders offered people with good credit histories

examples of “state laws, executive orders, and guidance adopted in response to the COVID-19
crisis that protect consumers from repossession of vehicles”).
42. See supra text accompanying note 10; COOPER, supra note 5, at 1.
43. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3–4).
44. See Eric Rosenbaum, The Used Car Boom Is One of the Hottest, and Trickiest, Coronavirus
Markets for Consumers, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2020, 9:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/
15/used-car-boom-is-one-of-hottest-coronavirus-markets-for-consumers.html [https://perma.cc/Z73
H-MY72].
45. See David Benoit, What Banks Tell Us About Covid-Era Business: ‘Everybody Is, Bluntly,
Struggling,’ WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-banks-tellus-about-covid-era-business-everybody-is-bluntly-struggling-11595064600 [https://perma.cc/B7
T2-UMVV].
46. See Rosenbaum, supra note 44 (noting that “dealers are accelerating digital efforts”);
Neal E. Boudette, Pandemic Forces Car Dealers to Do the Unthinkable: Sell Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/business/car-dealers-sell-online-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/T99G-TV6D] (discussing online car sales); Wayland, supra note 24 (detailing
dealers’ flexible purchase policies); Peter Campbell, Joe Miller, Claire Bushey & Kana Inagaki,
Time to Buy a Car? Industry Hopes for Coronavirus Silver Lining, FIN. TIMES (May 19, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/488d5886-c6af-4e80-a479-36aca26edd1d [https://perma.cc/4D
XP-LCXH] (discussing the auto industry outlook worldwide).
47. The Ford Promise, SIMMONS-ROCKWELL FORD INC., https://www.simmonsrockwellford.com/
the-ford-promise.htm [https://perma.cc/AQ7B-LH69].
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loans with delayed payment starts and attractive, seemingly below-market
interest rates.48
Along with trying to entice people to purchase cars with appealing
financing, reports suggest that auto lenders made deals with current
customers who were worried about falling behind on their loans.49 According
to data from TransUnion, the number of auto loans in deference or
forbearance or which were granted similar relief “doubled to 7.3 million
accounts” between April and May 2020.50
The increase in deferrals likely explains, at least in part, the decrease in
auto loan delinquencies in the second and third quarters of 2020.51 But these
deferrals are merely that—delays. And they were only given to some
customers. Based on the complaints that people lodged to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) during the pandemic about problems
working with auto lenders to modify or pause payments, a subset of
households did not receive relief.52 These complaints reflect other research
into disparities in who has received accommodations from lenders, with Black
and lower-income households facing more troubles in obtaining deals from
lenders or in taking out new loans, including for cars.53
Despite these stop-gap measures, at some point, possibly very soon,
people will have to start paying all their loans again—auto, student, and home.
Many people may not be able to do so. For instance, a survey conducted by
the United States Census Bureau in September 2020 found that a third of
respondents predicted that they would be evicted from their housing or have

48. See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Ben Eisen, Auto Lenders Try to Lure Borrowers with Generous
Terms—For Some, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/auto-lenderstry-to-lure-borrowers-with-generous-termsfor-some-11588411801 [https://perma.cc/VA4V-HPGZ].
49. See Auto Lenders Keep Market Afloat During Pandemic, TODAY’S MOTOR VEHICLES (June 25,
2020), https://www.todaysmotorvehicles.com/article/auto-lenders-keep-market-afloat-duringpandemic [https://perma.cc/QB7Z-Y8NT] (reporting select data about auto loan modifications
granted in the second quarter of 2020).
50. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Americans Skip Millions of Loan Payments as Coronavirus Takes
Economic Toll, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/americansskip-millions-of-loan-payments-as-coronavirus-takes-economic-toll-11592472601 [https://perma.cc/
JW43-QSKX].
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
52. See GIDEON WEISSMAN, R.J. CROSS, ED MIERZWINSKI & LUCY BAKER, AUTO LOAN COMPLAINTS
RISE: PANDEMIC WORSENS EXISTING CONSUMER PROBLEMS WITH CAR BUYING IN CFPB DATA 11
(2020), https://uspirgedfund.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/AutoLoanComplaintsRise/WEB_USP
_CFPB-Auto-Loan_Report_1020_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQV-W2G9]; see also Pamela Foohey,
Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177,
181–84 (2017) (detailing the CFPB’s complaint function).
53. See Susan Tompor, What It Takes for Risky Borrowers to Get a Car Loan, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct. 7, 2020, 12:24 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-finance/susan-tompor/20
20/10/07/car-loans-covid/3517293001 [https://perma.cc/22E6-HME3]; Diana Olick, A Troubling
Tale of a Black Man Trying to Refinance His Mortgage, CNBC (Aug. 19, 2020, 3:38 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/19/lenders-deny-mortgages-for-blacks-at-a-rate-80percent-higherthan-whites.html [https://perma.cc/U9RH-97MQ].
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their home foreclosed within the next 60 days, despite the CARES Act’s
protections.54 This teed up the possibility of a “COVID cliff”—”as many as 6.4
million evictions filed in [2020] could take effect” at the beginning of 2021.55
Likewise, two studies released in October 2020 found that although the
CARES Act kept millions of families out of poverty at the beginning of the
pandemic, households have exhausted their relief funds and poverty levels
had surged to levels higher than prior to COVID-19’s emergence.56
Similarly, and with the aid of the CARES Act and states’ interventions to
help families, auto lenders have merely propped up the market. But there is
a limit to how long dealers and lenders will be able to steady the market. In
the coming months, the cracks in the auto sales and lending industry will
likely expand, prompting a crisis.
This crisis will hurt communities of color and lower-income households
to a greater degree than other households because of long-standing
disparities in auto sales and lending, including during the pandemic.57 These
communities always have been at the forefront of those that would be most
affected by an auto loan bubble burst. Likewise, by the end of 2020, it had
become abundantly clear that the pandemic’s overall economic effects
disproportionately fell on and would continue to fall on communities of color
and lower-income households.58 Which means that the auto loan market’s
reckoning will coincide with the pandemic’s larger economic fallout. The
silver lining of this timing is that it might provide a needed jolt to prompt
discussions about putting into place longer-term, more comprehensive
interventions in the auto sale and loan markets.

54. See Sylvan Lane, Nearly One-Fourth of American Households Facing Layoffs or Pay Cuts: Census
Bureau, HILL (Oct. 7, 2020, 11:50 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/519992-nearly-onefourth-of-american-households-facing-layoffs-or-pay-cuts-census [https://perma.cc/6ZC2-DTXA].
55. Niv Elis, US Economy Hurtles Toward ‘COVID Cliff’ with Programs Set to Expire, HILL (Nov.
22, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/526964-us-economy-hurtles-toward-covidcliff-with-programs-set-to-expire [https://perma.cc/GUL7-BZT4].
56. See Jason DeParle, 8 Million Have Slipped into Poverty Since May as Federal Aid Has Dried Up,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/us/politics/federal-aidpoverty-levels.html [https://perma.cc/8FHR-5PLA].
57. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9–10) (discussing disparities in auto sales and
lending based on race, ethnicity, and income); WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 9 (noting that
people’s complaints to the CFPB about auto loans reflected disparities in access existing prior to
the pandemic); Tanvi Misra, Mapping the Subprime Car Loan Crisis, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 12,
2018, 12:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/urban-institute-maps-us-car-loan-debt-and-delinquency [https://perma.cc/PE3L-JCBU] (discussing data from the Urban
Institute about disparities in auto loan defaults in communities of color across the United States).
58. See Heather Long, Andrew Van Dam, Alyssa Fowers & Leslie Shapiro, The Covid-19
Recession is the Most Unequal in Modern U.S. History, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/coronavirus-recession-equality/ [https://perma.cc/
F9XA-4W3H].
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III. PICKING UP AFTER THE BUBBLE’S BURST
Even though the auto loan market has expanded significantly in the past
decade—bringing increasing delinquencies and defaults with it—there has
been little in-depth discussion about how to address the likely burst of the
market’s bubble. The literature that exists, however, highlights how auto
sellers and lenders have benefitted from and exploited the lack of regulation
of one of the most complex transactions that people will enter into during
their lives. Understanding the dynamics that have allowed for the rapid rise
in auto loans outstanding is an essential step in considering how to restructure
the market for cars and auto loans. This Part begins with an overview of the
auto sale and loan markets and then outlines a range of financial and related
measures that could shift market dynamics.
A. AUTO SALES AND LOANS TODAY
Auto loans stand apart from all other types of credit extended to
consumers. Besides a home mortgage, an auto loan is the only secured debt
that most people will incur.59 Auto lenders, like mortgage lenders, almost
always require that borrowers give rights in the financed vehicle to lenders
that allow for repossession and sale upon borrowers’ defaults.60 Student loans,
credit cards, medical debt, and most other consumer debts, in contrast, are
unsecured.61 These lenders cannot reach people’s assets without going
through at least some court proceedings.62
Even though auto loans are secured debts, people in danger of having
their cars repossessed and sold have few legal protections that they can call
upon, such as the waiting periods and right of reinstatement typically allowed
by state law for home foreclosure.63 Instead, auto repossession and sale can
59. See Jesse Bricker, et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from
the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 18 tbl.3, 22 tbl.4, https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5W2-QKVE] (reporting
based on the Survey of Consumer Finances that in 2016, 85.2 percent of households owned a car
and that 63.7 percent of households owned a home and that most people’s loans were home
loans, student loans, car loans, and credit cards).
60. See Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 300–03 (discussing repossession
and sale); Vehicle Repossession, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 2008), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
articles/0144-vehicle-repossession [https://perma.cc/EA6D-9LH5] (same).
61. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4).
62. These proceedings are typically state court debt collection actions that can end with
seizure of non-exempt assets (to the extent that the borrower has any non-exempt assets), with
garnishment of bank accounts, or with wage garnishment. See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF STATE COURTS (2020), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q826-4E9E] (discussing debt collection proceedings); Foohey et al., Debt Collection Pandemic, supra
note 23 (discussing how COVID-19 could increase debt collection).
63. Cf. Vehicle Repossession, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 2008), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
articles/0144-vehicle-repossession [https://perma.cc/4M3J-NBME] (“In many states, your
creditor can seize your vehicle as soon as you default on your loan or lease.”). Some states give
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happen quickly.64 Indeed, repossession can happen instantaneously upon
default if the lender has installed a starter interrupter device or other vehicle
tracking and disabling tool in the financed vehicle.65
Auto loans also stand apart from other consumer credit, including home
loans, because of the inter-twining of the lending process with vehicle sales.
In The Fast and the Usurious, Adam Levitin detailed this inter-twining in the
context of the typical auto loans, meaning those that people take out as part
of their car purchases.66 After people negotiate the vehicle purchase, which is
a complicated and atypical purchase that includes the price of the car plus
any selected upgrades, the value of trade-ins, the addition and deletion of
warranties, and miscellaneous service contracts, they then must negotiate
financing. Unless customers have arranged third-party financing in advance
—for example, from a local credit union—people will get their auto loan
through the dealer from which they are purchasing the vehicle.67 This is the
case if people purchase vehicles at auto company franchises, such as Ford or
Toyota authorized dealerships, or independent used-car dealerships, such as
“Buy Here Pay Here” car lots. Nearly ninety percent of buyers obtain their
auto financing through dealerships.68 Making the transaction even more
confusing, the loan pricing itself might also be linked with the vehicle
purchase terms, such as the value of trade-ins and selected warranty
provisions.69
When people receive loans through auto dealerships, these loans
typically come from banks and other lenders that partner with the
dealerships. Auto sellers will make a loan to a customer only after they line up
the customer’s lender, to which the loan is immediately assigned.70 Other
dealerships, such as those authorized under a franchise agreement with Ford,
use in-house lending arms, such as Ford Motor Credit.71 Across these deals,
borrowers a short time period to reinstate auto loans after repossession. See My Car Has Been
Repossessed, and I Was Told It Will Be Sold. What Can I Do?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 23,
2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/my-car-has-been-repossessed-and-i-was-toldit-will-be-sold-what-can-i-do-en-865 [https://perma.cc/A8NZ-HJSK].
64. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 23–27) (detailing “the booming auto repossession
industry”).
65. See id. (manuscript at 24) (discussing starter interrupter devices, that “allow the lender
or dealer that controls the device to disable the ignition switch of a vehicle, preventing it from
starting”).
66. See generally Levitin, supra note 6 (describing the potential abuses facing consumers
stemming from the inter-twined nature of vehicle purchases and auto loan financing).
67. Id. at 1261–64.
68. Id. at 1262. Levitin also details “yo-yo” scams in which customers drive off with a vehicle
only to be told a couple days later that they were not approved for the financing and must agree
to a higher interest rate if they want to keep the vehicle. Id. at 1304–06.
69. Id. at 1261–62.
70. See id.
71. See D&B Business Directory: Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, DUN & BRADSTREET,
https://www.dnb.com/business-directory/company-profiles.ford_motor_credit_company_
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the business relationship initially is between the dealership and the lender,
not the lender and the actual borrower. This exacerbates a sales and lending
structure that already disadvantages customers.72
In addition, financial technology (“fintech”) innovations in auto sales
and lending continue to alter how people shop for cars by moving a portion
of “traditional” car sales and loan deals effectuated wholly at dealerships to
virtual marketplaces. In my recent article, Consumers’ Declining Power in the
Fintech Auto Loan Market, I detail the emergence, growth, and adaptation of
website and applications designed for smartphones and tablets that promise
to deliver cars and loans to people rapidly, such as Carvana and AutoGravity.73
Like “traditional” auto dealerships, these platforms typically partner with
banks and other lenders, similarly making the lender the platforms’
customers, not the people who are purchasing or leasing cars.74
Overall, as I argue in my article, the auto loan origination market
prioritizes the interests of lenders over those of customers, which has led and
will continue to lead people to agree to loans with disadvantageous (and
inflated) interest rates, fees, and terms.75 That most people in America need
a vehicle for their daily lives only adds to dealers’ and lenders’ leverage used
to extract concessions from customers. Levitin likewise comes to the same
conclusion, asserting that the inter-twining of auto sales and lending has
cultivated an auto loan market “rife with opportunities for various forms of
abuse and fraud.”76
The potential for consumer abuses has come to pass, at least based on
consumers’ complaints and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)’s actions
regarding auto loans. People’s complaints and these actions take aim at tactics
that may stem from the inter-twining of auto sales and lending: attempts to
make people agree to expensive add-on products, such as service plans,
perceived high-pressure sales methods generally, and “yo-yo financing” and
changing loan terms.77

llc.cb3110fa6a44f57e2f2e6704cc273538.html.
72. See Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8–11) (detailing how the market disadvantages
customers).
73. See id. (manuscript at 11–17).
74. See id. (manuscript at 15).
75. See id. (manuscript at 23–27).
76. Levitin, supra note 6, at 1330.
77. See generally WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 52 (detailing people’s reported problems);
David Shepardson, Santander Agrees to $550 Million U.S. Settlement over Subprime Auto Loans,
REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-autos-lending/santanderagrees-to-550-million-settlement-over-subprime-auto-loans-idUSKBN22V2GS [https://perma.cc/62H
P-HCJ6] (detailing the FTC’s settlement with Santander about its underwriting practices for
subprime loans); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Returns More Than $3.5 Million to
Consumers Subjected to Deceptive and Unfair Sales and Financing Tactics by Los Angeles-Area’s
Sage Auto Group (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/12/ftcreturns-more-35-million-consumers-subjected-deceptive-unfair [https://perma.cc/D5CN-988M]
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These tactics add up to lots of money for auto sellers and lenders. One
marker for how much profit the sales and lending structure yields is “marked
up financing” paid by car buyers. Mark ups refer to amounts added to a loan
by the dealer who arranges financing for a customer, including a commission
known as the “dealer reserve” or “finance reserve,” which adds one to two
percent on the lender’s interest rate, and extended warranties and other
protection products.78 In 2019, the typical car buyer paid roughly $1,860 in
marked up financing.79 As calculated by Levitin based on a prior study of auto
loan overcharges, marked up financing amounted to over $54 billion in
2018.80 This sum reflects about 10 percent of the total of $584 billion of auto
loan originations in 2018.81
Over the past decade, the relative proportion of profit that auto dealers
have made from car sales versus car financing has narrowed. For instance, in
2011, dealers made 66 percent of their profit from car sales versus 34 percent
from car financing.82 In 2018, this balance had flipped, with dealers making
money from car loans than car sales.83 Dealers should be increasingly more
interested in selling auto loans than actual cars.
Part of the transition from an auto sales market that focuses on selling
cars to one focused on selling car loans dates to the Great Recession and the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), which created the CFPB.84 The Dodd-Frank
Act explicitly excluded auto sellers from the CFPB’s rulemaking, supervision,
and enforcement authority.85 This carveout accelerated the inter-twining of
auto sales and auto loans.86 Similarly, as noted by Edward Balleisen and
Melissa Jacoby, car dealers have succeeded in lobbying at the state level,
leading to the lack of state-level regulation of auto loans, and have a lobbying
force that is ready to take on proposed regulations.87

(reporting on the FTC’s settlement with Sage Auto Group for engaging in “‘yo-yo’ financing
tactics”); supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing “yo-yo” scams).
78. See Markup Index, OUTSIDE FIN., https://www.outsidefinancial.com/auto-loan-markupindex [https://perma.cc/EN6P-Q6A9] (detailing auto loan markups).
79. Id.
80. Levitin, supra note 6, at 1292 n.140.
81. See Press Release, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Total Household Debt Rises as 2018 Marks
the Ninth Year of Annual Growth in New Auto Loans (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.newyork
fed.org/newsevents/news/research/2019/20190212 [https://perma.cc/3LCS-NP57].
82. See Markup Index, supra note 78.
83. See id.
84. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
85. See Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby, Consumer Protection After the Global Financial
Crisis, 107 GEO. L.J. 813, 824–30 (2019) (discussing the lobbying that led to this carveout).
86. See id. at 829–30 (discussing the change in the auto loan market and its parallel to the
mortgage market that played a significant role in the Great Recession).
87. See id. at 829.
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The current structure of auto sales and lending has created an
unsustainable sector in need of change, even before the adverse economic
conditions brought by the pandemic. The pandemic’s economic fallout might
provide the necessary jolt to foster legislative change.
B. REFORMING AUTO SALES AND LOANS IN THE FUTURE
Going forward, to make any significant changes, car dealers and lenders
will have to yield to regulators. The pre-pandemic growth in auto loans,
coupled with the foreseeable spike in defaults and eventual crash in the auto
loan market, might make now the moment to push for auto loan regulations.
It also might be the time to advance broader ideas for changes to how and
what type of automobiles are sold in the United States, which will affect the
auto loan market.
Beginning with proposals to address problems in today’s auto loan
market, legislatively vesting a federal agency with the ability to regulate auto
dealerships is a necessary first step. As the agency designed to protect
consumers in financial transactions, the CFPB provides a natural place to put
such authority.88 Once given authority to regulate dealerships, the CFPB (or
any agency vested with such authority) should aim to dismantle the key
elements of car sales and loans that grant outsized power to dealerships.
As Levitin has identified persuasively, the current structure of car sales
and loans taking place simultaneously, either in-person at dealerships or
facilitated through online platforms, is the foremost barrier to consumer’s
ability to stand on equal footing with dealers and lenders.89 Levitin proposes
a three-day waiting period for people who buy cars with financing if they seek
financing through the dealership and a penalty-free prepayment right if
people obtain third-party financing during this waiting period.90 The waiting
period would apply to vehicle, trade-in, and loan pricing. The intuition
behind this waiting period is to relieve people from pressure to accept the
deal offered to them and to incentivize people to shop for financing apart
from the car itself. Levitin projects that this disruption in the market will
create competition among dealers to reduce markup financing and reduce
opportunities for discrimination in sales and lending.91
Beyond uncoupling the timing of car sales from extension of auto loans,
drawing from existing consumer credit regulations, other market

88. See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895, 895
(2015)(“The CFPB is the most important recent development in consumer law.”). See generally
Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 321 (2013) (providing and overview of the CFPB).
89. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1264–66.
90. Id. at 1319–26.
91. See id. (arguing that incentivizing consumers to secure financing for vehicle purchases
before the transaction will shift the competition from third-party financial institutions to vehicle
dealerships).
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interventions might take two orientations: those aimed at informing buyers
and those aimed at restricting sellers. Most prevalent among regulations of
other consumer credit products are those that attempt to provide buyers with
understandable information about these transactions, such as the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“Credit CARD
Act”).92 For auto sales, disclosures might include clear quotes for price
elements, such as warranties, option packages, and the destination charge,
and for the total sticker price. For auto loans, disclosures might include details
about the credit score relied on by lenders.
In comparison, and also as included in the Credit CARD Act, regulations
may restrict dealer and lender practices, such as limiting fees and other
charges that come with a loan, including upon default, or mandating ability
to pay standards.93 In the context of automobiles, drawing on the above
discussion about problems that people face purchasing cars, restrictions could
include a cap on markup financing, caps on specific elements of financing,
limiting the length of loans to match the predicted useful life of vehicles, and
a prohibition on “yo-yo financing.”94 States also can legislate similar
protections, as a handful of states already have done, such as Texas’s motor
vehicle installment sale form with informational language about markups.95
These various protections and proposals will be a step forward in
imposing at least some constraints on the industry. Nonetheless, as I argue in
my recent article, people’s need for cars to survive day-to-day in most places
in the United States is so great that these regulations likely will not
significantly disrupt dealers’ leverage against customers, and particularly
those with the least ability to bargain.96 As with payday loans and other fringe
credit, the needs of the most vulnerable individuals transcend disclosures and
regulations, and they will continue to agree to car sales and lending deals
effectively regardless of their terms.97 With the growth of fintech platforms,
even if people try to shop around for auto loans, counter-intuitively, it may
become harder for them to identify lenders who have not partnered with
dealers and thus to find competitive deals. Indeed, within a few months, the

92. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in relevant part at U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(f), 1681, 1693).
93. See id.; Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 36–42) (reviewing ideas taken from other
consumer credit products that put people on similar footing with auto dealers and lenders).
94. See supra text accompanying note 68.
95. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1313–14 (discussing potential disclosures); Foohey, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 35) (same).
96. Foohey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 10–11).
97. Id. (manuscript at 5, 6 n.35) (noting research about the conditions under which people
will take out payday loans and use other alternative financing). Of course, there always will be
people who find a way to live “car free” while others take out and default on auto loans. But I
argue that the United States’ cumulative decisions to elevate driving and personal vehicles as the
main mode of transportation in America has rendered cars and car loans necessities that set them
apart from other consumer goods and credit productions. See id. (manuscript at 1–2).
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COVID-19 pandemic had already transformed how auto sellers interact with
customers such that dealerships moved more sales online and tried to offer a
more “flexible” purchase process.98
In short, the United States’ elevation of driving as the mode of personal
transportation has the potential to negate regulations that will maintain the
status quo regarding how people purchase cars. Something more is needed.
Besides fostering a rise in auto loans, the status quo has encouraged a
proliferation of larger passenger vehicles, particularly sport utility vehicles
(“SUVs") and pickup trucks, in the United States’ market.99 Today, SUVs and
pickup trucks constitute 70 percent of all new vehicle sales.100 Although
manufacturers have advanced in making these vehicles more energy efficient
and reducing their emissions levels, the vehicles themselves get worse gas
mileage and have higher emissions than passenger cars and even smaller
SUVs.101 Being bigger, they also are more dangerous when involved in motor
vehicle accidents.102 But the prevalence of larger vehicles on American roads
means that more people want to purchase similarly large vehicles for their
and their family’s safety.
Just as COVID-19 has disrupted the status quo in many Americans’ lives,
it presents an opportunity to disrupt the status quo in the American car
market. The last time a similar disruption occurred was following the Great

98. See Todd C. Frankel, No Handshakes. A Bad Economy. These Car Salesmen Shifted Tactics — and
Succeeded., WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/road-torecovery/2020/08/12/no-handshakes-bad-economy-these-car-salesmen-shifted-tactics-succeeded
[https://perma.cc/J9CH-Z8QP]; Michael Wayland, The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Upended Auto
Sales and Buying a Car Will Never Be the Same, CNBC (May 21, 2020, 1:57 PM), https://www.cnbc
.com/2020/05/21/the-coronavirus-pandemic-has-upended-auto-sales-and-buying-a-car-will-neverbe-the-same.html [https://perma.cc/6MP5-4UCW]; Benoit, supra note 45.
99. See Highlights of the Automotive Trends Report, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/automotivetrends/highlights-automotive-trends-report [https://perma.cc/9N95-NRBU] (detailing the
production share and fuel economy of vehicles and showing the rise in truck SUVs, which are
larger or 4WD vehicles).
100. See Lawrence Ulrich, S.U.V. vs. Sedan, and Detroit vs. the World, in a Fight for the Future, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019,), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/business/suv-sedan-detroitfight.html [https://perma.cc/L9GD-FNK9].
101. See id.; Marianne Lavelle, U.S. Automakers Double Down on Trucks & SUVs, Despite Talk of a
Cleaner Future, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
15102018/automakers-gm-ford-pickup-suv-electric-vehicle-emissions-standards-climate-changeindustry-bailout [https://perma.cc/CEB7-3ZJT].
102. See Shill, supra note 3, at 500–02 (discussing the costs of car accident injuries and
fatalities); SUVs More Deadly to Pedestrians than Cars: U.S. Insurance Study, REUTERS (June 16, 2020, 9:16
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-safety-insurance/suvs-more-deadly-to-pedestriansthan-cars-u-s-insurance-study-idUSKBN23N297 [https://perma.cc/2DGE-RJ8G] (reporting on an
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (“IIHS”) study); Mack Hogan, SUVs Are 28 Percent More
Likely to Kill Other Drivers in a Crash, Which Is Somehow a Massive Improvement, JALOPNIK (Oct. 12,
2019, 11:40 AM), https://jalopnik.com/suvs-are-28-percent-more-likely-to-kill-other-drivers-i1838994674 [https://perma.cc/JN9W-Y7PW]; Samuel S. Monfort & Joseph M. Nolan, Trends in
Aggressivity and Driver Risk for Cars, SUVs, and Pickups: Vehicle Incompatibility From 1989 to 2016, 20
TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION S92, S95—S96 (2019).
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Recession. At that time, in response to a drop in car sales, Congress enacted
the Car Allowance Rebate System, colloquially known as “Cash for Clunkers,”
which allowed people to trade-in older cars for newer, more fuel-efficient
vehicles.103 The system essentially was a scrappage program, with the goals of
rescuing struggling auto manufacturers and dealerships, to promote
environmentally-friendly vehicles, and to reduce economic inequality.104
Within a couple months after the pandemic’s emergence, news stories about
the potential enactment of a similar plan began appearing.105
As part of a larger strategy to tackle the pandemic’s economic fallout,
Congress could adapt and update the Cash for Clunkers program to promote
safer and more equal access to automobiles. Also, any program that provides
subsidies should restrict those subsidies to only electric vehicles. For example,
people could receive a tax credit or cash toward the purchase of select electric
vehicles. The program also could include dedicated funds for building
electric charging infrastructure, which might incentivize auto manufacturers
to allocate production capacity to electric vehicles. For instance, in summer
2020, as part of his Presidential campaign, Joe Biden announced an
environmental plan with similar ideas, including tax subsidies for electric car
purchases, incentives to trade-in fuel-inefficient vehicles, and building public
electric charging stations across the country.106
States also can play a role in incentivizing the manufacture of electric
vehicles. California Governor Gavin Newsom’s September 2020 executive order
requiring sales of all new passenger vehicles to be zero-emission by 2035
provides a first step and primer for other states.107 The order’s timeline also

103. See Alisa Priddle, Potential Cash for Clunkers Revival Could Mean Big Car Deals Are Coming,
MOTORTREND (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.motortrend.com/news/cash-for-clunkers-revival2020-car-deals [https://perma.cc/B83R-9N7E] (detailing the Cash for Clunkers program);
Christina Romer & Christopher Carroll, Did ‘Cash-for-Clunkers’ Work as Intended?, WHITE HOUSE:
BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010, 8:42 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/04/05/didcash-clunkers-work-intended [https://perma.cc/GQ3Q-ZTXY] (noting studies about the effects
of Cash for Clunkers).
104. See generally Shanjun Li, Joshua Linn & Elisheba Spiller, Evaluating “Cash-for-Clunkers”:
Program Effects on Auto Sales and the Environment, 65 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 175 (2013)
(discussing Cash for Clunkers).
105. See, e.g., Kea Wilson, Don’t Bring Back Cash for Clunkers Because of COVID-19, STREETSBLOG
USA (May 13, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/05/13/dont-bring-back-cash-for-clunkersbecause-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/36M8-ML88] (discussing issues with the first Cash for
Clunkers program and arguing that the program should not be revived in a similar form); John
M. Vincent, Ready for Cash for Clunkers 2.0?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/cash-for-clunkers (projecting that the federal government will need
to step in to support the auto industry); Priddle, supra note 103 (discussing Cash for Clunkers
program and arguing that the previous program could serve as a template for a similar program).
106. See Tim Mullaney, How Biden’s $1.7 Trillion Climate Plan Would Change America After Trump’s
Big Oil Presidency, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/01/bidens-1point7trillion-climate-plan-would-be-blow-to-big-oil-.html [https://perma.cc/X27G6JLM].
107. Governor Newsom Announces California Will Phase Out Gasoline-Powered Cars & Drastically
Reduce Demand for Fossil Fuel in California’s Fight Against Climate Change, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN
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demonstrates that federal and state programs must recognize that changes in
auto manufacturing and sales will not be instantaneous—that is, they must play
the long game. Nonetheless, within mere months of California’s
announcement, General Motors announced that it is transitioning to an allelectric portfolio.108 This shows that the auto industry is willing to adapt to
regulations aimed at vehicles.
In addition, any new program must prioritize the manufacture of safer and
smaller vehicles, which is vital to improving not only energy efficiency and the
environmental impact of the cars on American roads, but also the safety of
drivers and pedestrians. As compared to other high-income countries, the
United States trails far behind in reducing deaths and non-fatal injuries caused
by crashes.109 The types of cars on the road is one key factor in preventing
accidents and serious injuries because of accidents.110 Other factors include
standards for safety, with an eye toward protecting motorists and pedestrians
alike, even if that goal comes at the expense of speed,111 and mandates for
installation of technology that assists drivers, such as blind spot detection and
collision avoidance.112
Finally, any program designed to improve the environmental impact and
safety of cars also must account for the costs of such regulations, and those
costs’ impact on communities of colors’ and lower-income individuals’
already disparate access to vehicles. A primary criticism of the Cash for
NEWSOM (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/09/23/governor-newsom-announcescalifornia-will-phase-out-gasoline-powered-cars-drastically-reduce-demand-for-fossil-fuel-incalifornias-fight-against-climate-change [https://perma.cc/Z8SV-CUNQ].
108. See Press Release, Gen. Motors, GM Boosts Investment, Grows Electric Portfolio to Lead
in EV Race, (Nov. 19, 2020), https://investor.gm.com/static-files/66b83c73-17f3-426a-9618393cea479c19 [https://perma.cc/B2NK-5H6X]. At the same time, General Motors dropped its
support of President Trump’s lawsuit seeking to nullify California’s orders and regulations
regarding vehicle emissions. See Coral Davenport, G.M. Drops Its Support for Trump Climate Rollbacks
and Aligns with Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/
climate/general-motors-trump.html [https://perma.cc/P3L8-X6FW].
109. See Sara C. Bronin, Rules of the Road: The Struggle for Safety & the Unmet Promise of Federalism,
106 IOWA L. REV. 2153, 2158–59 (2021) (discussing how auto standards prioritize passenger
safety to the detriment of pedestrians and passengers in other vehicles); Erin K. Sauber-Schatz,
David J. Ederer, Ann M. Dellinger & Grant T. Baldwin, Vital Signs: Motor Vehicle Injury Prevention
—United States and 19 Comparison Countries, CDC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6526e1.htm [https://perma.cc/Z8RU-ZBBY] (comparing injuries
from motor vehicles in the United States with 19 other high-income countries).
110. See Laurel Wamsley, Fatal Pedestrian Crashes Increasingly Involve SUVs, Study Finds, NPR
(May 14, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/14/611116451
/fatal-pedestrian-crashes-increasingly-involve-suvs-study-finds [https://perma.cc/F7AH-9MA5];
supra note 102 and accompanying text.
111. See Shill, supra note 3, at 512.
112. See Legislation to Make Cars in America Safer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.
& Com. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. 5 (2019) (statement of Catherine Chase,
President, Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/
20190724/109842/HHRG-116-IF17-Wstate-ChaseC-20190724.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS2J-926V]
(discussing this technology).
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Clunkers program was that it increased these disparities by reducing the
available stock of less expensive vehicles.113 Now more than ever, any program
that provides subsidies, funds infrastructure for vehicles, or imposes
regulations on passenger cars must not only contend with how they will affect
affordability, but also should seek to decrease the costs of vehicle ownership
and usage, particularly given that such programs necessarily will perpetuate
America’s history of prioritizing driving.
IV. TRANSFORMING TRANSPORTATION IN AMERICA
Instead of augmenting America’s car economy, the shock of the COVID19 pandemic might present the opportunity to change the landscape of
transportation in the United States. Federal, state, and local government
decisions that have led to the prevalence and importance of having a car also
have created sub-optimal investments in infrastructure to support other modes
of transportation and, more broadly, of living.114 Most people must drive to
work and to meet their daily needs. People “driving alone accounts for 76
percent of all commuting trips” according to the Department of
Transportation.115 With the exception of select cities, using public
transportation is extremely inefficient. Research has shown that ride-hailing
services, such as Uber and Lyft, increase road congestion and miles traveled by
vehicles, while decreasing other transit trips. This suggests that people replaced
some of their trips on public transportation with these services, evidencing the
inefficiencies of public transportation.116 Many people also live far from where
they work, because they moved to the suburbs or could not find affordable
housing near employment opportunities.117
Re-orienting government policies and programs to diminish the United
States’ car-centricity would represent a revolutionary tactic to address the
almost inevitable burst of the auto loan bubble. In recent years, scholars have
detailed the faults in the United States’ transportation policies.118 As such, this
113. See Wilson, supra note 105 (discussing criticisms of Cash for Clunkers).
114. See generally Shill, supra note 3 (arguing that U.S. law incentivizes car ownership at the
expense of non-drivers).
115. Kevin DeGood, A Reform Agenda for the U.S. Department of Transportation, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Sept. 9, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/
2020/09/09/490158/reform-agenda-u-s-department-transportation [https://perma.cc/A9GNXKM6].
116. Michael Laris, Uber and Lyft Concede They Play Role in Traffic Congestion in the District and Other
Urban Areas, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/
2019/08/06/uber-lyft-concede-they-play-role-traffic-congestion-district-other-urban-areas [https://
perma.cc/A253-GHD4].
117. See DeGood, supra note 115.
118. See, e.g., Shill, supra note 3, at 503–06; OWEN D. GUTFREUND, TWENTIETH-CENTURY
SPRAWL: HIGHWAYS AND THE RESHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE 5 (2004) (describing how
the United States transportation landscape evolved to accommodate cars). See generally HIGHWAY
ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY (Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S.
Johnson & Angel O. Torres eds., 2004) (analyzing the intersection of transportation and civil rights).
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Part focuses on three key determinants of people’s necessary reliance on cars
to meet their daily needs and details how these changes to transportation and
other infrastructure might affect the market for auto loans.
First, the existence of reliable and efficient mass transportation is
perhaps the foremost determinant of whether people can realistically meet
their needs day-to-day without having a car. At present, in many areas in the
United States, even in most medium and larger cities, mass transportation is
time-wasting and undependable.119 Relying on buses often will turn what
should be a quick commute into an hours-long saga.120 Investing in mass
transit infrastructure tailored to meet the needs of daily commuters and to
foster mobility within cities promises to do the most to decrease people’s need
for cars and to allow them to truly live car-free. It also will remedy the wrongs
of decades of underfunded and deteriorating transportation systems that
leaves communities of color struggling to access reliable and safe mass transit,
despite their much higher reliance on public transportation.121
States, cities, and towns (and their residents) seemingly have begun to
recognize the value of investing in mass transit. During the 2020 election, 13
of 17 state and local transit measures on ballots passed, amounting to a total
of $38 billion in funding for public transportation.122 As noted by
commentators, these measures might have passed, in part, because of the
pandemic, not in spite of it.123 Now is the moment to shift national, state, and
local priorities away from building infrastructure for cars to fixing and creating
infrastructure for mass transit. More and better mass transit options for getting
people to work will relieve the urgency to own a car or more than one car.

119. See Jonathan English, Why Did America Give Up on Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.),
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/201808-31/why-is-american-mass-transit-so-bad-it-s-a-long-story [https://perma.cc/6MLZ-Y3JJ] (arguing
that the transit service times offered are not adequate to attract riders).
120. See Mike Maciag, Riding Transit Takes Almost Twice as Long as Driving, GOVERNING (Feb. 2017),
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-transit-driving-times.html
[https://perma.cc/M9UY-ZCYG] (detailing the disparity in time it takes to drive versus to take
public transit in large metropolitan areas).
121. See generally Deborah N. Archer, Transportation Policy and the Underdevelopment of Black
Communities, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2125, 2141–45 (2021); Christof Spieler, Racism Has Shaped Public
Transit, and It’s Riddled with Inequities, KINDER INST. FOR URB. RSCH. (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2020/08/24/transportation-racism-has-shaped-public-transitamerica-inequalities [https://perma.cc/LL6E-5ZJL].
122. See Kea Wilson, State and Local Transit Won in a Landslide Yesterday, STREETSBLOG USA
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/11/04/state-and-local-transit-won-in-a-landslideyesterday [https://perma.cc/5354-6SAB] (providing and overview of these ballot items).
123. See id. (quoting a tweet that read: “It says something that despite historic low transit
ridership due to the pandemic (and all the associated doom and gloom), *people are still hopeful
enough about the future to recognize that investing in transit is essential*”); Adele Peters, Austin,
Texas, Just Voted to Spend $7 Billion on a Transportation Revolution, FAST CO. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.fastcompany.com/90572127/austin-texas-just-voted-for-a-transportation-revolution [https://
perma.cc/M9X9-XYU9] (quoting an advocate, Adam Greenfield, as saying “[m]ore and more
people, and more and more leaders, are realizing that we actually need transportation choices”).
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Making cars less of a necessity should benefit the most vulnerable individuals in
the auto lending market by inuring to them the leverage necessary to consider
a transaction and walk away if they find the terms of the deal disadvantageous.
Second, prioritizing roadway and transportation projects that include
safety measures for pedestrians, bikers, and other non-vehicle transportation
devices, such as scooters, is a natural and necessary complement to focusing on
mass transit. America’s streets and roadways are, simply stated, dangerous, and
the effects of that danger fall disproportionately on communities of color.124
Roadways’ lanes are wide, which encourages speeding.125 Traffic signals focus
on the swift movement of vehicles to the detriment of bikers’ and pedestrians’
safety.126 Sidewalks are too narrow, are in disrepair, or are entirely absent.127
People will not be able to access improved buses, light rails, and other mass
transit safely and efficiently if the journey on foot from where they live to the
transit stops is treacherous.
In addition, upgrading roadway access for bikers and fixing and adding
sidewalks for pedestrians alone—absent improvements in mass transit—might
decrease the number of car trips people need to make.128 In many areas, there
presently are not sufficient sidewalks to access grocery stores, pharmacies, and
other stores. This leads people to drive from store to store. Simply investing in
upgrades to sidewalks, installing clear crosswalks and signage, and tearing down
barriers that force people to walk in roads will allow access to stores without
using a car and will allow people to car-pool and park once for essential
shopping. What might look like subtle changes in accessibility could collectively
lead many households to shift their transportation choices away from using cars
every day. And this could ultimately allow households to become one-car or nocar households.
Third, and finally, changes to urban planning might do the most to
encourage a shift in car usage. Over the past decades, retailers and city planners
have traded investment in walkable urban squares and city downtowns for
suburban shopping malls designed to cater to automobiles. This car-centric

124. See Bronin, supra note 109, at 2164 (discussing the role that the design of roads plays in
everyday safety). See generally ANGIE SCHMITT, RIGHT OF WAY: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SILENT
EPIDEMIC OF PEDESTRIAN DEATHS IN AMERICA (2020) (discussing the danger of roadways to
pedestrians and that danger’s intersection with systemic inequality).
125. See Chris McCahill, More Evidence that Wider Roads Encourage Speeding, STATE SMART
TRANSP. INITIATIVE (Oct. 31, 2016), https://ssti.us/2016/10/31/more-evidence-that-wider-roadsencourage-speeding [https://perma.cc/2JSJ-4UA3] (reporting on a study in the Journal of
Transportation Engineering that “found that drivers travel 2.2 mph faster, on average, in 12-foot
lanes than in comparable 11-foot lanes”).
126. See Bronin, supra note 109, at 2166.
127. See Vanessa Casado Perez, Reclaiming the Streets, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2185, 2188–89 (2021)
(discussing sidewalks in the United States).
128. See id. at 2189–90 (noting the benefits of investing in “pedestrianization”).
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model has added to people’s need to own cars.129 It also has fostered a shopping
culture in which people drive from location to location to access stores that
might be a mere couple hundred feet from each other. In the last few years, a
handful of retailers have returned to opening stores in downtown areas, in
recognition that downtowns now are “under-retailed” and that more
professionals are opting to live in cities.130 Early reports find that creating
walkable urban areas is both sustainable and profitable.131
In terms of chipping away at the supremacy of cars, construction projects
that focus on building main street-like areas bring two main benefits. The
smaller, more immediate benefit is to decrease the need for multiple cars and
multiple trips to accomplish day-to-day shopping. Instead, households can
carpool to an urban area, park once, and complete all their shopping without
driving from store to store. This alone might allow families to shift from two to
one vehicle or household groups to collectively own one vehicle. It also
necessarily will make cities more pedestrian friendly, which should yield an
outsized benefit to communities of color.
Such urban planning projects also bring a bigger, longer-term benefit by
fostering the building of housing in the one area, which can eliminate the need
to own a vehicle. Either this housing will be situated such that people can walk
to work, school, daycare, and urban shopping areas, or, combined with
improvements in mass transit, people will be able to easily go about their daily
business without owning a car. Stated differently, construction projects that will
reduce the distance between housing, work, access to food, necessities,
childcare, and healthcare, might be the most expensive, but, in turn will do
the most to move the United States away from its current car-centrality. By
reducing the desperate need to own a vehicle, people will gain leverage in the
auto sales and loan markets. The auto loan market, in particular, will have to
adapt to people’s newfound freedom in choosing among transportation
options.
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic brings an inflection point in the United States’
car economy. Prior to the pandemic, the buildup in auto loans outstanding,
and concomitant growth in auto loan delinquencies and defaults foreshadowed
a burst of the auto loan bubble. Although the market has not collapsed as of

129. See Robert Steuteville, Changes in Retail Encourage Walkable Urban Designs, PUB. SQUARE
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2019/12/04/changes-retail-encourage-walkableurban-designs [https://perma.cc/GEZ2-G6Z3] (discussing retail store design in the shift from
urban downtowns to suburban shopping centers).
130. Id.
131. See Patrick Sisson, Why Building Walkable Cities Is the Key to Economic Success, CURBED (June
24, 2019, 4:51 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/6/24/18715939/real-estate-developmentwalkable-urbanism (discussing a study by The Center for Real Estate and Urban Analysis, Smart
Growth America/LOCUS, Cushman & Wakefield, and Yardi Matrix).
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the end of 2020, in the coming years, the United States will have to handle the
pandemic’s economic fallout. One aspect of that fallout most likely will be an
auto loan crisis. Given the deep-rooted disparities in the auto loan market,
lower-income households and communities of color will bear the brunt of this
coming crisis.132 More broadly, the crisis will come at a time when other
consumer credit markets also are collapsing,133 creating a perfect storm of
financial issues for households.
In the face of this storm, the United States will have the opportunity to
change how people purchase cars and take out car loans. Accumulated
decisions by federal, state, and local governments have created and perpetuated
people’s need to have access to vehicles to survive day-to-day. This has left
people at a disadvantage when purchasing cars and seeking financing for those
cars—a disadvantage so severe that typical consumer credit interventions might
be insufficient to disrupt auto dealers’ and lenders’ hold over customers.
The appetite for more structural change in the wake of the pandemic
might present legislators an opportunity to alter the dynamics of the auto loan
market by attacking not auto loans themselves, but by encouraging changes in
the types of vehicles that people can purchase. Even more broadly, the
pandemic presents a critical moment for the federal government, states, cities,
and towns to shift their priorities away from vehicle-centered infrastructure to
building better mass transit, fixing and adding pedestrian-friendly
infrastructure, and constructing walkable urban areas. Not only will these
changes pick up after the burst of the auto loan bubble, but they also will offer
people a lasting solution to the financial problems they currently face because
of the primacy of driving in America.

132. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
133. For instance, another collapse in the home mortgage market has been predicted. See
Diana Olick, Coronavirus Effect Could Be ‘Far Deeper than the Subprime Crisis,’ Says Mortgage Company
CEO, CNBC (Apr. 1, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/01/coronavirus-effectcould-be-far-deeper-than-the-subprime-crisis-says-mortgage-co-ceo.html [https://perma.cc/HV7NBE7Z].

